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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium dual labour market model which in-
corporates union bargaining with monopolistically competitive firms. It is shown
that not only the degree of union bargaining power but also the market power
firms possess on the product market have a positive influence on unemployment.
The reason for this is that less intense product market competition increases the
negotiated wage rates as well as the price mark-up firms charge over their mar-
ginal costs, both of which reduce labour demand. It is also shown that higher
competition intensity will force firms to merge to larger units.
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11 Introduction
How does the presence of trade unions affect unemployment? Most labour market
models analyse this question within a single labour market economy. However,
there is substantial empirical evidence that wages differ significantly and persist-
ently across sectors of an economy and that this wage structure cannot be solely
explained by differences in human capital or general work characteristics (see, e.g.
OECD (1994)). This leads to the conclusion, that the wage differences are more
likely to stem from market imperfections and that emphasis needs to be placed
on the differences between sectors of the economy.
The paper presented here, explains these wage differentials by the interaction
of unions with firms facing imperfect competition on the product market. This
is done by assuming the existence of a dual labour market, an approach first
developed by Harris, Todaro (1970) and further developed in seminal articles
by Calvo (1978), McDonald, Solow (1985) and Bulow, Summers (1986).
In this class of models, the labour market is dichotomised into a primary sector
where, for example, wages are higher, there is more job security, lower turnover
rates etc. and a secondary sector, where the exact opposite holds. Essentially,
seeing as these permanent wage differences cannot be explained by differences
in human capital, age, race or other worker characteristics, it is assumed that
wages are attached more to jobs rather than workers, with all “good” jobs in one
sector. Although in reality, of course, the labour market can be segregated into a
whole continuum of sectors, the simplifying assumption of only two sectors has
proven to be a good approximation with a large body of empirical evidence in
support of the theory (see, e.g. Dickens, Lang (1993) and the survey in Saint-
Paul (1996)). Within the framework here, the economy produces a composite
manufacturing good in the high-wage (or primary) sector and a traditional good
in the secondary sector.
The traditional sector is comprised of menial jobs for which the wage is determ-
ined by market clearing. However, as the product market in the manufacturing
sector is characterised by imperfect competition, rents will accrue here. This gives
unions an incentive to operate in this sector as they will bargain for a share of
this economic surplus for their members. As a result, wages in this sector will
be above their market clearing level, i.e. an equilibrium non-competitive wage
2differential exists between the two sectors. These higher wages will induce agents
currently not employed in this sector to be prepared to spend a longer time (a
longer unemployment spell) applying for these jobs. Therefore, increased compet-
ition on the product market which leads to lower rents and thus also lower wages,
should also lead to lower unemployment. This is exactly the idea stated in the
OECD Jobs Study (see OECD (1994), p.23) and presented more formally below.
The interaction of unions and price-setting firms has been taken up by Dutt,
Sen (1997) and Arnsperger, de la Croix (1990). However, in contrast to
here, both of these models only assume a single sector labour market. There
are also several recent papers which analyse various affects of unions within a
dual labour market setup. Roberts et al. (2000) analyse a two-stage bargaining
process in which unions first determine a national minimum wage and then sub-
sequently the wage in the primary sector. A dynamic innovation-based growth
model is developed by Stadler (1999). The original Calvo (1978) model is
extended by Dixon et al. (1999), who incorporate a standard menu cost setup.
Finally, Burda (1992), analyses how unions affect unemployment duration spells.
However, apart from the model by Stadler (1999), all of these papers have in
common that the product market is treated as being perfectly competitive. How-
ever, this is, of course, not only an unrealistic assumption, but also overlooks
the fact that the labour and product market are uniquely interdependent.1 The
approach used here, is to extend the original Calvo (1978) model by introducing
monopolistic competition in the manufacturing sector. This means that firms here
have some degree of market power, but this market power decreases as competi-
tion becomes more intense. In fact, one of the main expected effects of European
monetary unification often stated, is that product market competition is expec-
ted to become more fierce, leading to lower unemployment rates in the long run.
Seeing as especially in countries like Germany, unions still have considerable influ-
ence on labour market outcomes, the paper here analyses the effects of increased
competition when firms and unions bargain over wages.
We find that higher market power on the producer side increases wages and also
reduces the negative unemployment effect of higher wages. The reason for this is
1 Stadler (1999) assumes a perfectly competitive consumer goods sector and an imperfectly
competitive intermediate goods sector. Whereas in that model, market power arises due to
innovative activities, here it stems from the consumer demand side.
3that less intense product market competition allows firms to more easily pass on
higher labour costs to consumers. Therefore, the (absolute) elasticity of labour
demand with respect to wages decreases. As union utility is assumed to depend
both on the attained wage level for its members as well as the number of mem-
bers themselves, a lower wage elasticity will induce unions to raise their wage
demands so that the bargained wage level and consequently unemployment, in-
crease. These theoretical findings are confirmed in empirical research by, amongst
others, Nickell (1999), and Nickell et al. (1994).
The next section derives the optimal consumption and production decisions of
the agents in the economy. Sections 3 and 4 outline the wage bargaining process
and general equilibrium. A conclusion is presented in Section 5.
2 Household and Producer Decisions
The economy is divided into two sectors. In one sector, a composite manufacturing
good M , is produced, whilst the other sector is engaged in the production of a
traditional good T . Unions operate in the high-wage manufacturing sector and
bargain with the employers over the wage level, whereas the labour market in
the traditional sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.2 The assumption
that unions only operate in the high-wage sector is common, (see, e.g. Layard
et al. 1991) the reason being that there are no economic rents to be shared in the
traditional sector. As shown below, the bargained wage is always above the wage
level paid in the traditional good sector.
The economy consists of N homogeneous and risk-neutral workers who are alloc-
ated across the sectors as follows
N = NM +NT (1)
2 Market clearing in the secondary labour market is not contradicted by empirical evidence in
Europe (see Dolado et al. 1996). There is of course a wage floor influenced either by the level
of social security in a country or national minimum wage levels. However, seeing as unions
here are concerned about relative wages, the absolute height of the wage in the traditional
sector is not important. See, e.g. Jones (1987) for a model with a binding minimum wage
level in the secondary sector.
4NT = LT , NM = LM + UM (2)
where NT is the total size of the traditional, NM that of the manufacturing
workforce and LM the number of workers actually employed in the (high-wage)
manufacturing sector.
Due to the above market-clearing wages, unemployment UM occurs in the man-
ufacturing sector as some individuals choose to wait for a high-paying job, i.e.
they decide not to take up a job in the low-wage sector. This is in accordance
with the empirical evidence, that although unemployment is a bad signal, being
in a low-wage job may well be an even worse signal.3 As the labour market in the
traditional sector always clears, the employed labour force LT , and the total size
of this sector NT , always coincide.
2.1 Households
Each household is treated as a dynasty for which the consumption level of future
members is important. All dynasties are assumed to have the same discount rate
and identical preferences. To simplify the analysis, an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution equal to unity is chosen, so that the optimisation problem can be
written as
U(C) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnCtdt (3)
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference and Ct is total consumption of
a composite good at time t with
Ct =M
µ
t T
1−µ
t (4)
where µ is the expenditure share spent on manufacturing goods. M represents a
bundle of n varieties of the manufacturing good for which households’ preferences
3 See Laing (1993) and McCormick (1990), for theoretical models of signalling and job search
as well as Bulow, Summers (1986), who provide both theoretical arguments and empirical
facts within a dual labour market model on the assumption that only the currently unemployed
will receive jobs in the high-wage sector and as to whether this kind of unemployment is
voluntary or involuntary. This assumption is further justified by van den Berg, Ridder
(1998), who found empirical evidence in a number of OECD countries that workers search
more easily – and therefore find jobs more easily – when unemployed than while employed.
5are given by a CES utility function (see Dixit, Stiglitz 1977)
M =
[
n∑
1
mκi
] 1
κ
, 0 < κ < 1 (5)
where mi is the consumed quantity of the manufacturing good of brand i. Here,
κ is a measure of the homogeneity of the goods. As κ approaches one, the goods
become almost perfect substitutes for one another, whereas the goods become
more heterogeneous the closer κ is to zero. Defining σ ≡ 1/(1 − κ), then σ
represents the elasticity of substitution between any two variants.
Consumers face a three stage optimisation problem. First, they must decide how
to divide total income between savings and consumption. Formally, households
maximise utility as given by (3) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
A˙ = rtAt + Iwt − PtCt (6)
where A denotes household assets, r is the interest rate, Iw is wage income and
P the macroeconomic price index. A dot over a variable denotes the derivative
with respect to time.
Solving this intertemporal optimisation problem results in the standard Keynes-
Ramsey
C˙
C
= r − ρ (7)
which implies
r = ρ (8)
in equilibrium.
In a second stage, in each period (so that the time index t can be omitted without
loss of information) consumers optimally allocate their total income between man-
ufacturing and traditional goods, that is they choose M and T so as to
maxC =MµT 1−µ s.t pMM + pTT = I
where pT the price of the traditional good and I denotes total household income.
pM is the price index of the composite manufacturing good which is defined as
pM ≡
[
n∑
1
p1−σmi
] 1
1−σ
(9)
6with pmi as the price demanded by firm i in the manufacturing sector. Thus, a
higher number of firms operating in this sector reduces the price index. As can
be seen from equation (5), consumers have a “love of variety” and an increase in
the number of brands produced between which consumers can choose increases
their utility.
This optimisation problem results in
T =
1− µ
pT
I and M =
µ
pM
I (10)
as the income shares spent on traditional and manufacturing goods respectively.
In a third step, consumers decide how to divide their total spending on manu-
facturing goods amongst the n variants. This leads to a demand for variant i by
household j of
mij =
p−σmi
p−(σ−1)M
µI (11)
Assuming that the number of firms n is large means that the effect on the price
index pM of a change in the price of a single firm pmi can be neglected. In this
case, the (absolute) price elasticity of demand for each variety is constant and
equal to σ.
2.2 Firms
Each firm in the traditional sector produces according to an identical technology,
with aggregated output given by
T = LT (12)
This means that labour in this sector has a constant unitary marginal productiv-
ity. Seeing as firms in this sector face perfect competition, it must hold that
pT = wT (13)
with wT as the traditional sector wage rate.
Labour productivity in this sector is normalised to one. Therefore, the price level
in the traditional sector is also unity.
7Production by a single manufacturing sector takes places according to
mi = ΓLαmi , Γ > 0, 0 < α < 1 (14)
where Γ is a parameter denoting the technological level and Lmi is the amount
of labour employed by firm i in the manufacturing sector. Further, firms also
incur fixed costs F . This means that there are a finite number of firms and the
sector is characterised by increasing returns to scale. Therefore, given the demand
function for variants of the manufacturing good (11), firms maximise their present
discounted value Vmi
max
Lmi
∫ ∞
0
piie−rtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[pmi(mi)mi − wmiLmi − F ]e−rtdt (15)
where wmi is the wage paid by firm i in the manufacturing sector. This optimisa-
tion problem is identical in every period so that the time index t can be omitted
without loss of content. Profit maximisation leads to
pmi =
1
κ
wmi
∂mi/∂Lmi
(16)
From (16) it can be seen that κ, defined above as 1−1/σ, is both a measure of the
heterogeneity of goods and also indicates the degree of product market compet-
itiveness. Thus, 1/κ denotes the mark-up factor by which prices exceed marginal
costs. Thus, a higher value of κ implies a higher degree of market competition,
with σ = ∞(κ = 1) as the special case of perfect competition. Put differently, a
lower value of σ or κ, means that firms have a greater degree of market power.
Totally differentiating (16) with respect to labour and wages and assuming sym-
metrical firms, making it possible to drop the index i gives
κ
∂pm
∂m
∂m
∂Lm
dLm +
wm∂2mi/∂L2m
(∂m/∂Lm)2
dLm − 1∂m/∂Lmdwm = 0
which using the production function as given by (14) and rearranging yields
dLm
dwm
wm
Lm
≡ Lm,wm = −11− ακ (17)
Equation (17) shows that a reduction in product market competitiveness, i.e. a
lower value of κ, reduces (in absolute terms) the elasticity of labour demand. This
is because lower pressure from competitors means that firms can demand higher
8mark-up prices. Therefore, if wages increase, firms do not have to bear the total
burden of these increased costs by dismissing workers, but can instead pass on
some of the higher costs to the consumer. The more market power a firm has, the
higher is the share of the burden that is passed on to consumers and the lower is
the share that the firm itself has to bear, i.e. the lower is the number of workers
that are dismissed.
The wage rate in the manufacturing sector results from negotiations between
unions and employers. Unions derive utility from wages and employment levels.
Specifically, the unions’ aim is to demand higher wages than those paid in the
traditional sector, i.e.
max
wm
V =
∫ ∞
0
[Lmt(wmt − wTt)]e−ρtdt (18)
where V represents intertemporal union utility and ρ is the union discount rate.
As above, the wage rate will be constant in a steady state so that the time index t
can be omitted. Thus, during the wage bargaining process, a necessary condition
for unions to maximise their utility is
dV
dwm
=
∂V
∂wm
+
∂V
∂Lm
dLm
dwm
!= 0 (19)
There are two opposing effects in (19). On the one hand, increases in the wage
level directly increase union utility. On the other hand, there is an indirect effect
as the size of the workforce will decline with higher wages, thereby reducing union
utility. In the optimum these two effects need to be equalised.
3 Wage Bargaining
The most common way of modelling such negotiations is the (generalised) co-
operative Nash bargaining solution. Here, the Nash-maximand which is simply
the product of the respective difference in payoffs if an agreement is reached
to the payoff each party receives if no agreement is reached, is maximised with
respect to the wage level. If no agreement is reached, firms have a (negative)
fallback position pi0 = −wmF due to their fixed costs. For this reason, the Nash-
maximand effectively only contains variable profits piV net of the fixed costs, i.e.
9pi + wmF ≡ piV . For the unions on the other hand, this fallback position is the
wage rate paid in the traditional sector, which all workers could receive at any
time.4 Therefore, the Nash-maximand Ω is given by
Ω = V β(piV )1−β (20)
where β is the bargaining power that unions have.
Maximising the above with respect to the wage rate wm, leads to the following
(absolute and relative) wage in the manufacturing sector
wm =
ακ+ β(1− ακ)
ακ
(21)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
As is to be intuitively expected, the wage differential increases with union bar-
gaining power β. For the extreme case that unions have no bargaining power,
(β = 0), the wages in the two sectors equalise irrespective of the intensity of
product market competition. At the other extreme, if all the bargaining power is
with the unions, (β = 1), then the wage differential between the two sectors is
wm =
1
ακ
(22)
Equation (22) shows that the optimal wage from the viewpoint of the unions
is a decreasing function of product market competitiveness κ. This is because
more intense competition increases the labour demand elasticity with respect to
wages. Therefore, a given increase in the wage level will lead to a larger decrease
in labour demand. In other words, the negative effect on union utility of higher
wages gains in importance. For this reason, unions will lower their respective
wage demands. Thus, although product market competition is assumed to not
directly influence union bargaining power, it does have an indirect effect through
the elasticity of labour demand and thereby on the resulting wage rate. Therefore,
not only stronger union bargaining power, but also the product market power of
firms leads to higher relative wages. The first effect is a well-known result in the
literature. However, the effect that market power by firms has is often neglected.
4 Unions treat this wage as exogenous. In other words, they ignore the effect wage negotiations
in the manufacturing sector have on the labour supply in the traditional sector.
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A standard result in the literature is that wage bargaining solutions can be im-
proved, i.e. there exist Pareto-superior outcomes, if the employment as well as
the wage level are negotiated over.5 How efficient bargaining effects the results
obtained so far is discussed below.
4 General Equilibrium
As has been shown above, due to the presence of unions in the primary sector, a
non-competitive wage differential exists. Since labour is homogeneous, all workers
would prefer a job in the high-wage manufacturing sector. However, this wage
differential leads to lower labour demand than the market-clearing level, so that
not all workers can be absorbed by this sector. Therefore, workers at the beginning
of their careers or those that become unemployed if the firm they are working for
is forced out of the market, must decide whether to try and obtain a high-wage
job but face the risk of a period of unemployment, or to enter the traditional
sector where they can instantaneously find a job. In a steady-state equilibrium,
the present value of the income streams must be identical between these two
options.
For the reasons discussed above, only workers from the unemployed pool are con-
sidered for primary jobs. As there must be a positive probability of finding a job
in this sector, there must also be layoffs in any period of time. These occur due
to structural change in the economy, which means that each job in the manu-
facturing sector faces the constant exogenous probability s of being terminated.
Similarly, there exists a job-finding rate a, determined endogenously below. This
means that all possible transitions between the states of unemployment and the
primary sector are time-independent Poisson processes. As wages in both sectors
are constant and we concentrate on the symmetrical equilibrium where all firms
in the manufacturing sector pay the same wage, i.e. wmi = wM , the Bellman
equations for the three possible states a worker can be in, i.e. employed in the
5 See McDonald, Solow (1981), for a more detailed analysis and McDonald, Solow (1985),
for a dual labour market model with efficient bargaining.
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traditional sector, employed in the manufacturing sector or unemployed, are6
ρVT = wT (23)
ρVM = wM + s(VU − VM) (24)
ρVU = a(VM − VU) (25)
with VT , VM and VU as the respective present values associated with the three
states. Using the fact that in equilibrium the present value of becoming unem-
ployed must be equal to that of taking up a job in the traditional sector, VU = VT ,
means that equations (23) – (25) yield a job-finding rate a of
a =
ρ+ s
wM − 1 (26)
Equation (26) together with the steady-state flow condition whereby the number
of people being dismissed from the primary sector during any period of time must
equal the number finding a job in this time period, aUM = sLM , determines
unemployment as
UM =
sLM(wM − 1)
ρ+ s
(27)
Equation (27) fully closes the model. In Appendix 2 the general equilibrium values
for all endogenous variables are derived. The corresponding comparative static
results are given in Table 1.
The focus here is on the number of firms n and the unemployment rate uM . The
reason for this is that with the Dixit, Stiglitz (1977) setting of monopolistic
competition assumed here, firms act strategically independent of each other. This
has as a consequence that the size of the market neither has an influence on the
mark-up factor firms can charge over their marginal costs, nor does it influence
the scale at which these firms produce. Instead, all market effects work through
a change in the number of equilibrium varieties n which are produced in the
economy. This number is derived in Appendix 2 as
n =
µ(ρ+ s)N
F (1− µ)(ρ+ s) + Lm(wm(ρ+ s− µρ) + µρ) (28)
6 It is assumed that individuals have the same subjective discount rate ρ as do unions.
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Table 1: Comparative Statics
α β κ µ ρ Γ s F N
wm - + -
Lm + - + +
pm ? + - - +
n - + - + + - - +
pM ? + ? - - - + + -
M ? ? ? + + + - - +
LM + - + + + - +
NM + - + + - + +
NT - + - - + - +
Y - + - + + - +
uM - + - - +
with the wage rate as given by (21) and per-firm employment Lm as
Lm =
Fακ
wm(1− ακ)
From (28), it can be seen that the number of firms is negatively related to labours’
output elasticity α, and product market competition intensity κ. In both cases
a lower manufacturing sector wage results. However, this effect is outweighed by
the positive effect of both α and κ on labour demand, so that net costs increase,
forcing some firms to exit this sector as they now make a loss. Increases in κ have
the further effect of reducing the price a firm can demand, so that c.p., revenue
drops. As there is no strategic interaction between firms, lower revenue forces
some firms out of the market (or to merge with other firms). As can be seen from
equation (11), a lower number of firms, which reduces the price index pM , shifts
the demand curve for the remaining firms upwards. As prices and wages remain
unaffected by the number of firms, these higher sales automatically increase firms’
revenues. In other words, more intense product market competition leads to fewer
but larger firms. Similarly, higher fixed costs F , are also counteracted by fewer
firms operating at higher output levels. By analogy, higher union bargaining power
β, will lead firms to shed labour, reducing their wage bill. These firms will then
earn short-run positive profits, which will be eroded in the long-term as new firms
enter the manufacturing sector.
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Increases in either the consumption share of manufacturing goods µ, the subject-
ive rate of time preference ρ, or the size of the population N , all lead to higher
demand for manufacturing goods. This ensures that firms increase their revenue
and make positive profits in the short-term which induces more firms to enter
this sector.
The higher the exogenous job-separation rate s, the lower is the equilibrium
number of firms. The reason for this is that frictional unemployment increases so
that total wage income earned by the households in the economy declines. This
in turn means that demand for manufacturing products decreases, forcing some
firms to exit the market as they would make losses.
The other endogenous variable of crucial interest is the unemployment rate uM .
This is given by
uM =
UM
NM
=
βs(1− ακ)
βs(1− ακ) + ακ(ρ+ s) (29)
To understand the comparative static effects, it is necessary to analyse both the
change in employment and the number of workers looking for jobs in this sector.
Changes in either labours’ output elasticity α, competition intensity κ, or union
bargaining power β, all gives rise to an“output” and a“number of firms” effect on
total employment. The output effect occurs as higher values of α or κ both lower
wages (see equation (21)) and thus increase per-firm labour demand and output.
However, changes in these exogenous variables also lead to a lower number of
firms which has a negative effect on total output. It can be shown however, that
the per-firm output effect always dominates so that employment increases. By
analogy, a higher value of β, lowers both per-firm and total employment. The
effect on unemployment is not so clear cut. On the one hand, unemployment in-
creases with higher employment in this sector, (see equation (27)), on the other
hand, a higher value of α lowers the wage which reduces the number of unem-
ployed. However, it can be shown that the first effect dominates the second, so
that increases in α cause a rise in both the number of employed LM , as well
as the number of unemployed UM . Consequently, the total number of people in
this sector also increases. The same argumentation also holds for higher product
market competition intensity κ. However, since both also lead to higher labour
demand and, via lower wage rates, to a higher job-finding rate a (see equation
(26)), the net effect of both is a lower unemployment rate. Put differently, higher
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market power by firms, i.e. a lower value for κ, which leads to higher prices but
consequently also to lower product demand, will increase the unemployment rate.
The reverse arguments hold for higher values of union bargaining power β, which
decrease employment but increase unemployment. This has the net effect of re-
ducing the number of individuals in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, just as
higher market power by firms is bad for employment, so is higher union bargaining
power β. If unions have no bargaining power, i.e. β = 0, no unemployment will
exist. This is because in this case the wage differential between the two sectors
collapses, so that both markets pay the market-clearing wage rate.
The final two effects which can be seen from (29) is the influence that the subject-
ive discount rate ρ, and the job-separation rate s, have. Turning to the former, it
can be seen that a higher discount rate lowers the unemployment rate. This can
be explained twofold. Firstly, the consumption level increases as a result, lead-
ing firms to produce more and consequently hire increased levels of labour. This
means that the job-finding rate a increases. Secondly, some of the formerly unem-
ployed will now opt for a job in the traditional sector as with higher values of ρ,
the future is valued less. Therefore, an immediate low-wage income as opposed to
a spell of no income whilst applying for a high-wage job becomes more attractive.
Both effects lower the unemployment rate. The opposite holds for increases in
s. Although it too leads to a higher job-finding rate a, at the same time more
people become unemployed at any given time. This not only directly increases
unemployment but also indirectly via lower national income Y which in turn re-
duces production and labour demand. Lastly, it can be seen from equations (27)
and (29), that if s = 0, implying that there are no job-separations, then no un-
employed individual can ever hope to find a job in the high-wage sector. For this
reason, all workers who do not find a manufacturing sector job, will immediately
take up a job in the traditional sector.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a dual labour market model of wage bargaining between
unions and monopolistically competitive firms. It was shown that not only higher
union bargaining power increases wages but also that the wage rate is positively
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related to the amount of market power that firms face on the product mar-
ket. Since the unemployment rate is positively correlated to the wage differential
between the sectors, this means that both higher bargaining strength as well as
higher market power by firms will lead to an increase in unemployment. There
are two effects by which the level of product market competition influences un-
employment. Firstly, there is the direct effect by which more intense competition
leads to lower mark-up prices. This price reduction is concomitant with higher
product market (and therefore labour) demand. But there is also an indirect ef-
fect associated with the competition intensity. More intense competition means
that firms are less well able to pass on increased costs to consumers. Therefore,
the only other way firms can reduce their costs is by dismissing a part of their
workforce. Therefore, higher product market competition intensity also leads to
a higher (absolute) elasticity of labour demand. However, seeing as the level of
employment is important for union utility, unions will lower their wage demands
correspondingly. These lower bargained wages in turn mean that fewer workers
are dismissed and consequently, that the unemployment rate is lower.
It is these positive effects on unemployment of increased competition which are
often stated as one of the benefits of European Monetary Union. As price levels
become more comparable within the EU, it does indeed seem likely that this
will increase the elasticity of substitution between two variants leading not only
to lower wages but consequently also lower unemployment. The model here pre-
dicts that this increased competition will also have the effect of forcing firms to
merge, i.e. there will be fewer firms operating at higher output levels. With new
takeovers and mergers being continuously announced, this fits well with current
empirical observations. However, this emphasises that it is increasingly important
that government policies are aimed at strengthening product market competition
and that it is recognised that unions as such only have a dwindling influence on
national unemployment levels.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 Derivation of the Bargained Wage Rate
Maximising the Nash-maximand (20), with respect to the wage rate yields
∂Ω
∂wm
= βV β−1pi1−βV
∂V
∂wm
+ (1− β)V βpi−βV ∂piV∂wm
!= 0
which, using the envelope theorem can be simplified to
piV
∂V
∂wm
=
1− β
β
V Lm
with union utility given by (18), the above equation can be written as
piV
(
∂Lm
∂wm
(wm − wT ) + Lm
)
=
1− β
β
L2m(wm − wT )
piV
wmLm
(
∂Lm
∂wm
wm
Lm
(wm − wT ) + wm
)
=
1− β
β
(wm − wT ) (A.1)
With the specification of the production function as given by (14), it holds that
the variable profits to labour costs ratio is
piV
wmLm
=
1− ακ
ακ
(A.2)
With the wage rate in the traditional sector given by (13), the primary wage can
be determined by inserting (A.2) and the elasticity of labour demand as given by
(17) into (A.1) and rearranging to give
wm =
ακ+ β(1− ακ)
ακ
(A.3)
Appendix 2 Derivation of the General Equilibrium
Profit maximisation with respect to the (variable) labour stock employed in the
manufacturing sector yields
∂pi
∂Lm
= ΓακpmLα−1m = wm
pm =
wmL1−αm
Γακ
(A.4)
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with wm as defined by (21).
Due to the fact that there are no institutional barriers to market entry, in a steady
state, equilibrium profits in the manufacturing sector must be equal to zero. More
formally, by (15), this means that
pm =
wmLm + F
m
=
wmLm + F
ΓLαm
(A.5)
Combining (A.4) with (A.5) and inserting (21) for the wage rate yields
Lm =
F (ακ)2
(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ)) (A.6)
Inserting this result into either (A.4) or (A.5) yields the price level as
pm =
1
Γ
(
F
1− ακ
)1−α(ακ+ β(1− ακ)
(ακ)2
)α
(A.7)
The equilibrium number of firms can be found by noting that size of the tradi-
tional labour force LT , is given from equation (1) as
LT = NT = N −NM
with the size of the manufacturing labour force NM , defined by (2) as
NM = LM + UM
which, using (29), gives
NM = LM
(
1 +
s(wm − 1)
ρ+ s
)
⇒ NT = N − nLm
(
1 +
s(wm − 1)
ρ+ s
)
(A.8)
(A.9)
Total income Y , in the economy is by definition
Y = wTLT + wMLM + nF = pTT + pMM (A.10)
Using the optimal income shares spent on traditional and manufacturing goods
respectively, equation (10) yields
pTT
pMM
=
1− µ
µ
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which, using (5) and (9), assuming symmetrical firms and noting that the pro-
duction function (12) can be written as
LT =
1− µ
µ
npmm
=
1− µ
µ
n(wmLm + F )
=
1− µ
µ
(wmnLm + nF )
=
1− µ
µ
(wm(N −NT − UM) + nF )
NT
(
1 +
1− µ
µ
wm
)
=
1− µ
µ
(wm(N − UM) + nF )
NT =
(1− µ)
(
wm
(
N − snLm(wm−1)ρ+s
)
+ nF
)
µ+ (1− µ)wm (A.11)
Solving equations (A.8) and (A.11) for the number of firms n yields
n =
µ(ρ+ s)N
F (1− µ)(ρ+ s) + Lm(wm(ρ+ s− µρ) + µρ) (A.12)
=
µ(ρ+ s)(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
F
[
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2]
With symmetrical firms this leads to a price index given by
pM = pmn−
1−κ
κ
which, by inserting (A.7) and (A.12) yields
pM =
1
Γ
(
F
1− ακ
)1−α(ακ+ β(1− ακ)
(ακ)2
)α
×(
F
[
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2]
µ(ρ+ s)(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
) 1−κ
κ
(A.13)
Total manufacturing output is given by
M = mn
1
κ
which, using the above, leads to
= Γ
(
F (ακ)2
(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))
)α
×
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(
µ(ρ+ s)(1− ακ)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
F
[
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2]
) 1
κ
(A.14)
With the per-firm labour demand given by (A.6) and the number of firms by
(A.12), the total number of employed workers in this sector is
LM =
µ(ρ+ s)(ακ)2N
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2 (A.15)
Inserting (A.15) into the steady-state unemployment condition (29) gives
UM =
µsβακ(1− ακ)N
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2 (A.16)
Equations (A.15) and (A.16) determine the size of the manufacturing sector as
NM =
µακ[ακ(ρ+ s) + βs(1− ακ)]N
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2 (A.17)
Finally, with the size of the manufacturing sector as given by (A.17), employment
in the traditional sector is
NT =
(1− µ)(ρ+ s)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2 (A.18)
and national income is
Y =
(ρ+ s)(ακ+ β(1− ακ))N
[(1− µ)(ρ+ s) + µsακ][ακ+ β(1− ακ)] + µρ(ακ)2 (A.19)
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